The report says that data from acoustic sensors and strain gauges on board indicated that the hull had suffered a delamination after a dive to the Titanic in 2022, causing a loud bang. Rush was said to have dismissed that noise, and the report found that there was no one left at the company in 2023 who was able to adequately interpret the sensor data. The company’s director of engineering quit two months before the implosion.
“The power was consolidated in Mr. Rush,” says Neubauer. “There was no set standard for how loud a noise or how many noises would make you take it out of service. I think that was intentional. They didn’t want to take it out of service in the end.”
The report contains numerous recommendations that would increase federal oversight of submersibles operated by US companies. It would also require them to be certified with third-party organizations, such as Lloyd’s Register or the American Bureau of Shipping, even if they were operating in international waters like the Titan. That would practically rule out building a hull from carbon fiber, as none of those organizations have classed a crewed carbon fiber submersible to date. “It doesn’t seem to be the right material because of the way it takes cumulative damage over time,” says Neubauer.
Tony Nissen, OceanGate’s original director of engineering, questions the report’s blanket criticism of the carbon fiber hull and its acoustic monitoring system. He notes that problems with the Titan’s first hull were identified, in part, using the acoustic sensors, leading it to be scrapped and replaced. “The design was not inadequate. For anyone to say the design was inadequate they would have to address the original manufacturer’s analysis, and the success of the first hull,” he says. “The real-time monitoring worked as designed and intended but for the second hull they ignored it.”
“We commend the US Coast Guard for its thorough work in confirming what industry experts have long known about the Titan tragedy—it was preventable,” says Will Kohnen, executive director of the non-profit World Submarine Organization. “The challenge now is to move forward, building a better national and international regulatory framework for submersible operations, so that safety and responsible governance are the standard across this unique and complex industry.”
The Coast Guard report also touches on issues with the search and rescue response after the Titan went missing. Neubauer says that some of the organizations listed as OceanGate’s emergency contacts were not aware of the Titan’s dive plans, and that the company should have had a robotic remotely operated vehicle (ROV) capable of diving to the same depth as the submersible.
Although the world was on tenterhooks during the four day search and rescue effort for the Titan, Neubauer is skeptical that it could ever have succeeded.
“Even though we eventually found the submersible within the 96 hour window that was being advertised, I don’t think we could have recovered the sub or the people if they had survived and it was entangled at the bottom,” he says. The ROV that located the debris had only a minimal capability to move or free the Titan, especially given that there would have been less than an hour of oxygen remaining.
The Coast Guard report notes that if Rush had survived, he would possibly have been subject to criminal prosecution for negligence. It does not identify anyone else as subject to investigation. However, WIRED reported last year that the Southern District of New York was pursuing a criminal investigation into OceanGate, possibly related to its financing. The Department of Justice has not confirmed that investigation and its current status is uncertain.
Relatives of Nargeolet are suing OceanGate, Rush’s estate, and others involved in the Titan’s manufacture in Washington state. Survivors of Rush, Nargeolet, and the paying passengers have not responded to requests for comment.
OceanGate supplied the following statement: “We again offer our deepest condolences to the families of those who died on June 18, 2023, and to all those impacted by the tragedy. After the tragedy occurred, the company permanently wound down operations and directed its resources fully towards cooperating with the Coast Guard’s inquiry through its completion.”
